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What Women Know: The Power of Savoir in
Marguerite de Navarre’s Heptaméron

A

Nora Martin Peterson

U TEMPS DU ROY FRANÇOIS, premier de ce nom, y avoit une
dame [...] qui sçavoit bien faire ung bon compte,” begins novella 62
of the Heptaméron (451), and although the story goes on to revolve
around a woman who does not know how to tell her tale properly, readers are
reminded that Marguerite de Navarre, who is implied to be this noble lady,
knows how to tell a good story.1 Both savoir and connaître appear regularly
throughout the Heptaméron. According to Le Grand Robert, both verbs take
the sense of avoir présent à l’esprit starting in the tenth century. Around the
same time, savoir also means “to know how to do something,” and in the
eleventh century, connaître means “to experience something,” to know how
to do something or to know a person. Around the end of the same century,
connaître also takes on sexual connotations. Thus, by the sixteenth century, a
wide range of definitions would have been in play simultaneously, and Marguerite de Navarre takes full advantage of the spectrum of meanings in the
Heptaméron. In a text that purports to be filled with stories that its tellers (the
five men and five women of the frame, who together make up the devisants)
know to be true, knowledge—wielding it, representing it, and using it to make
a rhetorical point—commands a central role in the frame. As a writer who was
deeply invested in educating women and in advocating for a strong female
presence in early modern society, Marguerite de Navarre uses her Heptaméron as a site from which she can promote and experiment with different
kinds of female knowledge.
In this article I will argue that savoir—either the word itself or a demonstration of female-directed knowledge—appears at central moments in the
Heptaméron.2 Knowledge—as can be seen in the frame narrative—can be a
way for men and women to debate the relationship between the sexes. In the
novellas, knowledge is a tool that can put women in charge of a narrative normally driven by men. It can heal the injustices of male-dominated religious
corruption. But, as with almost any theme in the Heptaméron, knowledge is
not an unequivocally positive tool for women. Marguerite also includes
novellas in which female knowledge has ambiguous, or even disastrous, consequences for women. These stories seem to warn women that knowledge is
not always a trustworthy harbinger of success. It can also lead to the loss of
“
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reputation or honor. Knowledge, then, is a double-edged sword that can be at
odds with virtue, and that women must learn to wield wisely. But, I will ultimately suggest, Marguerite is certainly not implying that women shouldn’t
know things. Nor does she shy away from portraying women who use knowledge badly. Rather, the tension between different kinds of women and their
(ab)uses of knowledge reveals a text grounded in seemingly unresolvable
contradictions. Indeed, the instability in the Heptaméron that can be so frustrating also reflects its openness to multiplicity; any sign of equilibrium or
unanimity should be approached with caution.3 While Gérard Défaux writes
that the “beau souci d’équité [qui est] la véritable marque de fabrique du
texte,”4 I will argue that the sculpting of the frame to appear completely equitable, along with the carefully designed balance between the spiritual and
worldly, allows the dialogism in and between these spheres to play out internally (Défaux 133). When women use savoir in the Heptaméron, or when they
demonstrate that they know something, it fuels a conversation—not always an
unambiguous one—about women’s roles in communities of knowledge.
What women know, and how the text reflects the acquisition, possession or
loss of knowledge, creates a network of female-driven knowledge that underscores the author’s interest in promoting a strong female voice, reminding
readers that ultimately it is Marguerite herself who is managing the conversation. In recent years, scholars have questioned whether the Heptaméron is a
participant in the Querelle des femmes tradition due to its departure from many
of its hallmark techniques. Notably, as Carol Thysell points out in The Pleasure
of Discernment, it is not polemical, there is no catalog of famous women, and
it favors personal experience over the erudition of the past.5 Nancy Frelick has
also called into question the reliability of Marguerite’s proto-feminist stance;
she reminds readers that it is unclear whether Marguerite is “eager to expose
the condition of women” or more willing to grant women the subordinate role,
since the text relentlessly oscillates between both.6 Indeed, this instability and
openness is part of what drives the conversation; it is, I believe (and I am
hardly the first to argue so), part of what makes the Heptaméron so vibrant and
so representative of sixteenth-century thought (Frelick 25). Indeed, it is true, as
Cathleen Bauschatz has argued, that the Heptaméron does not prescribe one
way for women to read, listen or use words.7 For example, Bauschatz suggests
that although the Heptaméron implies a female readership with the rhetorical
“voylà, mes dames” at the end of almost every novella (105), it actually
reverses this message: “while [the phrase] seems to offer women listeners a
secure guide to behavior, the reactions of the women to the phrase show that
these precepts are suspect, and must often be rejected” (113). Women speakers,
22
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listeners, and devisantes must employ a certain sçavoir regarding the words of
this text. They must know when to take words at face value, when to reverse
them, and when to understand them within a broader context. And, as Hope
Glidden writes, “fiction writing [...] is a dissimulation—of sources, of realia,
of the contradictions that move its plots. The female author, as woman, is thus
twice a dissimulator, as a woman, and functionally as a male in her appropriation of language.”8 By strategically using savoir as an educational tool for her
readers, Marguerite’s voice is very much there, despite her careful work to
keep her presence an explicitly neutral one.
Thus, though it is true that the Heptaméron does depart from certain traditional characteristics, the Querelle des femmes was a fluid conversation that
developed over many centuries. Marguerite de Navarre’s text reinvents the
techniques of the Querelle in ways that ultimately work in favor of women by
breaking up the very binaries according to which women would be seen as
superior or inferior. Marguerite does more than reverse the injustices against
women; to do so would be, as Frelick has pointed out, to create a reiteration
of the same problem (23). Instead, the lack of resolution creates a new system
“wherein the binary categories [...] no longer apply” (23). Indeed, what this
text grants women is the possibility to use the inherent ambiguity of words,
and of the many things that female knowledge has come to mean, to their
advantage.9 By going out of her way to make the novellas more balanced, and
by focusing on debate, even (or especially) when no resolution can be
reached, and by the sheer fact that she is a woman writing this text, Marguerite subverts the male argument that female knowledge is harmful and/or
insignificant, presenting that knowledge instead as a way to gain “power in
spoken and written language” (Bauschatz 116).

Framing knowledge
“Au jeu nous sommes tous esgaulx” (12), proclaims Hircan, thus apparently
laying the groundwork for the discussions between the ten devisants that will
follow each tale. Indeed, this quote, along with the balance between Scripture
and storytelling that is to structure each of the days in the Heptaméron, is
commonly cited as one of the leitmotifs of the text. But Hircan’s statement
and the apparent balance between religious and secular deserve a closer reading that accounts for the appearance of the word savoir and Marguerite’s
interest in promoting a strong female voice.
In the prologue, Oisille takes on the spiritual direction of the devisants.10
Though they do benefit from the daily routine of the abbey at which they are
lodged, it is her expertise—which is notably not male and not that of a
VOL. 57, NO. 3
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monk—that guides the devisants towards an increasingly satisfactory religious experience.11 She recounts her own personal practice, developed over
many years, which consists of “la lecture des sainctes lectres [...] incontinant
que je suis levée, je prans la Saincte Escripture et la liz” (9). She suggests that
the devisants pass their days in spiritual reflection and prayer. Hircan’s
response, a proposition of sexual pleasure (10), pits the spiritual and carnal
extremes against each other in a juxtaposition of sexuality and spirituality that
will coexist—at times uneasily—in the Heptaméron. Hircan is in turn tempered by his wife Parlamente’s diplomatic compromise (prayer in the morning, followed by an afternoon of storytelling until vespers), which the
devisants happily accept (10–12). I wish to highlight the exchange between
Hircan and Parlamente here:
Hircan dist à toutes les dames: “Puisque ma femme a si bien entendu la glose de mon
propoz et que ung passetemps particullier ne luy plaist pas, je croy qu’elle sçaura myeulx
que nul autre dire celluy où chacun prandra plaisir […]”A quoy toute la compagnye s’accorda. Parlamente, voiant que le sort du jeu estoit tumbé sur elle, leur dist ainsy: “Sy je me
sentoys aussy suffisante que les Anciens, qui ont trouvé les artz et inventions nouvelles, je
inventerois quelque jeu ou passetemps pour satisfaire à la charge que me donnez. Mais, congnoissant mon sçavoir et ma puissance, qui à peine peult rememorer les choses bien faictes,
je me tiendrois bien heureuse d’en suivre de près ceulx qui ont desja satisfaict à vostre
demande.” (10–11, emphasis mine)

Hircan’s words to his wife hint at her understanding of his sexual proposal
(“elle sçaura myeulx”), thus his deferral is at least in part ironic. But Parlamente makes the most of her prise de parole and reclaims knowledge from the
realm of the flesh. Leaning on what might be read as (false) modesty, Parlamente rhetorically underscores the extent to which she is in control of the narrative. She takes Hircan’s quip and, using both verbs of knowledge, insists
that she will rely on what she knows, and she goes on to propose the structure
of splitting their time between spiritual and secular pastimes. Hers is a knowledge that gives direction to the entire text, reconciles the coexisting threads of
religion and pleasure, and empowers the women of the group to participate in
the creation of stories.
Between them, Oisille and Parlamente take control of the Heptaméron’s
frame. Oisille establishes herself as spiritual guide, and Parlamente converts
her knowledge into a plan of action. Turning once again to the proclamation
of equality at the end of the prologue, readers might wonder why, when he has
deferred any and all such powers to his wife, Hircan gets to be the mouthpiece
of equality. Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani suggests that “Marguerite est à la fois
Parlamente et Hircan, Oisille et Simontault, Longarine et Saffredent:
24
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partagée, non point entre réalisme cynique et idéalisme naïf, mais entre les
exigences de l’honnêtetée [...] et les tentations du plaisir.”12 By giving textual
equality to men and women during the game, and by splitting her voice until
it is “si discrète qu’elle semble parfois se réduire à celle d’une auditrice,
enregistrant contes et débats sans vouloir les orienter” (203), Marguerite’s
women have free reign to explore their own voices. By establishing Oisille
and Parlamente as the ones who know how to run the project, then allowing a
man to ‘generously’ suggest that even women are free to speak, Marguerite
and the women of the Heptaméron accept the subtly misogynistic terms of
equality offered by Hircan only to turn them upside down and open them up
to the scrutiny of women who know the power of language.13 At the end of
the discussion to novella 46, Oisille insists that the judgment of women
should fall to women themselves: “La correction des hommes appartient aux
hommes et des femmes aux femmes; car les femmes à corriger les hommes
seroient aussi piteuses que les hommes à corriger les femmes seroient cruels”
(375). Defaulting to the subservient position (again, an echo of the Querelle
des femmes) that women would not be fit to judge men, she turns the logic
around to make women the bearers of judgment upon their own sex. As such,
the Heptaméron establishes a world in which women play an active role in
shaping the language of their own stories.

Marguerite on the margins
Marguerite’s fictional appearances in her own text underscore her interest in
promoting what women know and, more importantly, what they can do with
the knowledge they acquire. References to the author also remind readers who
is in charge; often, her responses highlight the power of women to heal or to
correct misogynistic injustices where institutions, such as religion, cannot.
The strategic use of the verbs savoir and connaître drives the narrative of various novellas and allows the author to demonstrate her ability to navigate the
nuances behind different kinds of knowledge.
In novella 25, Marguerite, alluded to as the sister of a thinly veiled
François Ier, learns that her brother is using a nearby monastery as a shortcut
on his way to and from his lover’s house. When a monk lauds François’s
alleged piety, her curiosity is piqued: “La seur, qui eut envye de sçavoir quelle
congnoissance ce beau pere avoit de la bonté de son frere, l’interrogua si fort
que, en luy baillant ce secret soubz la foe de confession, luy dist” (253,
emphasis mine). He goes on to reveal François’s frequent appearances in the
house of prayer. Marguerite’s will to knowledge leads to a confession—she
and the monk trade roles in a move that puts her in charge of the narrative.
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Because she knows her brother well, Marguerite is immediately skeptical:
“[elle] ne sceut que croire; car, nonobstant que son frere feust bien mondain,
sy sçavoit elle qu’il avoit la conscience tresbonne et la foy et l’amour à Dieu
bien grande, mais de chercher supersticions ne ceremonyes autres que ung
bon chrestien doit faire, ne l’en eust jamais soupsonné” (253, emphasis mine).
What she knows (learns) from the monk stands in tension with what she
knows about her brother’s religious life. As a result of this tension, she confronts her brother to learn the truth: “elle s’en vint à luy et luy compta la
bonne oppinion que les religieux avoient de luy: dont il ne se peut garder de
rire, avecques ung visaige tel qu’elle, qui le congnoissoit comme son propre
cueur, congneut qu’il avoit quelque chose caché soubz sa devotion” (253,
emphasis mine). What Marguerite has learned from the monk provokes a
physiological reaction from François. It is enough to show his sister that there
is more to the story, which he goes on to tell. Though this is a lighthearted
example of Marguerite’s knowledge, it nonetheless reveals a woman in a
powerful position: she navigates the confessions of a monk and a king and can
parse the differences in each of their confessions. Knowledge is a work in
progress, but it is Marguerite who wields it; she uses it to unravel the narrative
and to reveal the amusing (but not so moral) way that François uses religion
as an excuse to perpetuate his tryst with his lover. By finding the truth, she
comes out as the knowledgeable heroine of the story, whereas the monk and
François both look comical by comparison.14 And by retelling the story,
shrouding it in the many layers of storytelling that make up the Heptaméron’s
fabric, she suggests that women have the power to command a narrative that
has been used only for increasingly corrupt and self-serving purposes by men.
In novellas where more is at stake for the women involved, Marguerite’s
presence and knowledge play an even more poignant role. In both novellas 22
and 72, women are duped into disgrace by corrupt members of the Church.15
In the former, Marie Herouet, who refuses to sleep with a lusty clergyman, is
sentenced to a life of isolation for her supposedly lewd behavior. Marguerite is
called upon to investigate, and, when she goes to question the prior for his
decision to treat Marie in this way, “il confesseroit que seur Marie Herouet
estoit une perle d’honneur et de virginité. La royne de Navarre, oyant cella, fut
tant esmerveillée qu’elle ne sceut que luy respondre, mais le laissa là, et le
pouvre homme, tout confuz, se retira en son monastere” (227, emphasis mine).
The text’s emphasis of Marguerite’s speechlessness, described here in a
common turn of phrase as not knowing how to respond, suggests that the withholding of knowledge can be a powerful rhetorical tool. Marguerite is usually
eloquent and knowledgeable, and more than willing to pass judgment, espe26
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cially when women have been unfairly wronged, and so her silence is more
telling than any words would have been. As a result, the prior feels the weight
of her silence and is shamed into retiring. The same turn of phrase appears in
the discussion of the novella. Nomerfide proclaims, “j’ay une si grant horreur,
quant je veoy ung religieux, que seulement je ne m’y sçaurois confesser”
(228). The ambiguity in this turn of phrase, which implies both not knowing
how to make a proper confession and also not wanting to because of the corruption of the sacrament, echoes the fictional Marguerite’s not knowing how to
respond to the prior. Lack, or absence of knowledge, stands in for the larger
sense of awareness (raised here by women) that something is not right.
In novella 72, a young girl is seduced repeatedly by a prior, under repeated
threat, until she falls pregnant. Mocked and ostracized by the women of her
order and the wicked prior, she leaves. Though her original plan is to seek
absolution from the pope, she is intercepted by a woman who turns out to be
Marguerite herself. Wary of telling her story to just anyone, the girl insists that
she will share her story only with the Queen of Navarre: “pardonnez moy, dist
la religieuse, car jamais autre que elle ne sçaura mon secret” (507, emphasis
mine). Taking the place of the pope, Marguerite herself hears the girl’s confession, takes control of the narrative, and rights the wrongs in this novella.
As the last novella in the Heptaméron (though not by design), readers are left
with the message that women, and what they know, are powerful agents of
healing, justice, and community. As Mary McKinley suggests, in both novellas 22 and 72 “the story ends with a woman of authority reestablishing order,
helping the female victim to resume normal life in a community of women
and having the wicked priest punished” (163). Marguerite’s careful but intentional cameo appearances make readers aware of the metatextual knowledge
that is guiding the entire text. Her fictional character also insists that knowledge is something quite natural for women to possess, to wield, and to use as
an agent of positive change. In this sense, knowledge—as a verb, as an action,
and even in its absence—very much underscores a reading of the Heptaméron
as a text interested in exploring the power of words. However, it is also a text
that shifts between text and metatext, and between truth and fiction. What of
the equally problematic shifting between knowledge and ignorance? What of
women whose knowledge leads them to bad behavior, or of those who suffer
because of what they do not know?
Ambiguous women and knowledge
Novellas 26 and 43 have frequently been read as stories of virtuous and
wanton women, respectively. These are the conclusions drawn by the
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devisants (though not unequivocally), and the two novellas can easily be read
against one another. Hope Glidden, for example, emphasizes the troubling
nature of both extremes—to repress one’s feelings to the point of death, in the
case of novella 26, and to indulge in one’s desires without reservation, with a
particular emphasis on the androgynous representation of Jambicque in
novella 43 as non-woman: “it is so unthinkable for a woman to display desire
that when she does, she is often redescribed as a male” (30). To contrast the
two stories, however, is to miss what they share: women who themselves are
deeply conflicted. Both the Lady of Pampluna and Jambicque manifest characteristics that render them ambiguous, even androgynous, but not in a way
that limits our interpretations of these characters. Quite to the contrary: what
these women know heightens the hybridity of their stories and complexifies a
straightforward reading. The Lady of Pampluna, who resists and dissimulates
the advances of her honorary ward despite the reciprocity of her feelings, only
to succumb to a melancholic fever—she seems to hold a double standard.
After the Seigneur d’Avannes returns from his “pilgrimage” (actually a sexual
escapade), she chastises him, “Monsieur, je ne sçay comme il va de vostre
conscience, mais vostre corps n’a poinct amandé de ce pellerinaige” (260),
though it is quite clear that she does, in fact, know with what kinds of activities his conscience has been occupied. Later, though the text states quite
clearly that she is happy to hear his true feelings, she dissimulates her own:
“Je sçay tresbien que je suis femme [...] et à l’heure, Monsieur, je sçay quel
langaige il fault tenir, mais pensez que vous n’aymez pas tant vostre propre
bien, personne ny honneur, que je l’ayme” (263). Invoking the “I know that I
am a woman” defense that (as we have already seen) is cleverly ambiguous,
the Lady of Pampluna shows what she knows selectively: she demonstrates
awareness of her position, proper behavior, and a sense of modesty, but she
does not reveal her true feelings. Her supposedly clever employment of savoir
backfires on her in the end: it shows no regard for the sexual connotations of
knowledge or for the tension between what she desires and how she acts. She
confesses: “Monsieur, l’heure est venue qu’il fault que toute dissimulation
cesse [...] mais saichés que le ‘non’ que si souvent je vous ay dict m’a tant
faict de mal au prononcer qu’il est cause de ma mort, de laquelle je me contante” (266). The Lady of Pampluna shows insight into her predicament: she
knows that her repeated refusals are the cause of her death, and she claims to
be happy about her decision to refuse him nonetheless. At the same time, it is
unclear how to reconcile her purported virtue with her hypocrisy (as sharply
critiqued by Hircan in the discussion). The Lady knows her feelings, she is
also aware of d’Avannes’s, but she uses what she knows to maintain her virtue
28
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at all costs.16 True, readers are left with the portrait of an unrelentingly virtuous woman, but I believe that Marguerite acknowledges the ambiguity of this
extreme: that virtue sometimes comes at a cost that, for some, might be too
steep, leaving them looking like fools rather than heroes.
The devisants are quick to condemn Jambicque, the lady in novella 43
who pursues the object of her lust anonymously, and who maintains this tryst
until her lover marks her cloak with chalk in order to determine her identity,
as an example of unruly female desire. However, while the discussion centers
on Jambicque’s folly, the story itself raises questions about what it means to
know someone—or oneself. I wish to focus only on Jambicque’s use of the
word savoir in one key passage. It is a savoir that separates her physical body
from her identity. When she approaches the object of her desire in order to
proposition him as her lover, she insists on anonymity, proclaiming,
“J’aymerois myeulx mourir que vous sceussiez qui je suis” (361). Clearly, she
has no problem with the man’s knowing her sexually, but the savoir here constructs a wall around the non-physical part of her identity—her self, her name,
her reputation. This view contrasts with that of Glidden, who writes that while
Jambicque “saves face,” she also loses it, by being redefined as a body having
no identity apart from her sexual organs” (Glidden 31). But in fact, by separating the physical and non-physical parts of herself with the nuance of the
word savoir, Jambicque does—or seeks to do—exactly this, to define herself
as a lady who does have an identity apart from her sexual organs. To be sure,
her behavior and lust may make her look more like a man than a woman, but
as a woman, she recognizes what is at stake in her decision to pursue a purely
sexual relationship, and she seeks to protect it by splitting her self into two
parts, a reading corroborated by the use of the verb savoir here, which creates
a contrast to the carnal knowledge of connaître (which, again, she expresses
no opposition to pursuing). Paula Sommers writes that Jambicque is suffering
from “strong feelings of guilt and unworthiness,” but I would suggest that the
situation is more complex.17 Realizing the scrutiny and judgment that women
face at court, she takes necessary and proactive steps to remain anonymous.
Of course, the lover’s desire to know triumphs in the end, and he calls her out.
Her denial of the whole affair pits his knowledge against her vow never to be
found out, and while readers and devisants know the truth, Jambicque seems
to get away with her reputation intact, a point that suggests that her attempt to
compartmentalize different kinds of knowledge was indeed successful.
In novella 62, on the other hand, it is made clear that the storyteller does
lose her honor, not necessarily as the result of her actions, but as the result of
her decision to tell her story for the amusement of others. Perhaps most imporVOL. 57, NO. 3
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tant, it is not knowing how to tell the story properly, in front of an audience
that explicitly knows the difference, that ruins her. The novella (told by Longarine) begins: “Au temps du roy François, premier de ce nom, y avoit une
dame du sang royal, acompaignée d’honneur, de vertu, et de beaulté, et qui
sçavoit bien faire ung bon compte” (451, emphasis mine). Notably, the
woman described in these opening lines is not the woman who is about to tell
her story. Rather, she is a versed storyteller, and one who is graced with many
of the same virtues that writers in the tradition of the Querelle des femmes
would celebrate. Indeed, the devisants (in particular, the devisantes) insist on
these same qualities in several discussions, notably after novella 43, where
Parlamente chastises Jambicque for lacking them: “l’honneur des femmes a
autre fondement: c’est douceur, pascience et chasteté” (365). Mathieu-Castellani suggests that “si Parlamente est assez audacieuse pour contester les
normes socio-culturelles de l’éthique masculine, elle exprime les opinions les
plus traditionnelles pour définir l’honneur féminine” (198). Through a complex mise en abyme, the Heptaméron suggests that female knowledge must be
combined with virtue. Novella 62’s mise en abyme of storytellers and listeners
is almost dizzying: author Marguerite, narrator Longarine, the good storyteller
of royal blood (Marguerite herself?), the bad storyteller who gives herself
away. As for listeners, there are the devisants, the readers, the same (good)
storyteller, and the other ladies who are present. I believe that Marguerite
intentionally creates multiple layers of readers and narrators in order to create
a diverse community of listeners. Stories, and by extension texts, have an
important role to play in the education of women. By linking virtue with storytelling, novella 62 underscores two of the Heptaméron’s messages: first,
that strong women know how to tell good stories, and second, that language,
knowledge, and virtue carry the power to change lives—for better or worse.
Women, in turn, must learn how to use what they know. When applied
thoughtfully, knowledge can protect, heal, reconcile or triumph over injustice.
However, knowledge is rarely so straightforward. The protagonist of novella
62, who knows the truth of what has happened before she begins her story,
cannot control the words that accidentally come out of her mouth. Purposely
juxtaposed with the virtuous, honorable, and beautiful lady who can wield her
words well, she represents what happens when knowledge gets out of hand,
and she suffers the consequences.
Far from straightforwardly quantifying what women know (or do not know
or should/not know), the Heptaméron creates a (literal) community of hybrid
knowledge. At times, Marguerite “reproduces the sexual typologies of the
querelle des femmes,” apparently, in other moments, “only to subvert them.”18
30
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The author’s experiments with women who know things or do not know
things, and who either know what to do with their knowledge or do not, are
complemented by the appearance of verbs of knowledge such as savoir and
connaître throughout the text. Ultimately, even in cases where the woman
employs knowledge badly, or does not know something that she should, what
women know becomes textually embedded in an open conversation about
gender. The Heptaméron’s oscillation between viewpoints results in a text that
“met en scène un conflit dont il ne peut assurer la solution par le simple jeu des
opinions contraires” (Mathieu-Castellani 200). Could there be a better way to
represent the Querelle des femmes in a century so filled with tensions and contradictions in matters of religion, the body, gender, and identity? True, there are
many women in the text whose knowledge is far from virtuous, or whose ignorance reflects badly on the female sex. But the insistence on this ambiguity, the
openness of the dialogue, and the text’s inclusivity make female knowledge
explicitly complex, nuanced, and dynamic. By extension, the Heptaméron suggests that language, text, and the telling of stories offer a way for women to
explore, question, and wield what they know. The authority of this female network of storytelling-based knowledge is deeply embedded in the Heptaméron:
if Marguerite de Navarre holds the pen, Oisille and Parlamente speak the words
that set the game of knowledge into action.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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